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This is a bibliography of books and articles on consciousness in philosophy, 
cognitive science, and neuroscience over the last 30 years. There are three main 
sections, devoted to monographs, edited collections of papers, and articles. The first 
two of these sections are each divided into three subsections containing books in 
each of the main areas of research. The third section is divided into 12 subsections, 
with 10 subject headings for philosophical articles along with two additional 
subsections for articles in cognitive science and neuroscience. Of course the division 
is somewhat arbitrary, but I hope that it makes the bibliography easier to use. 
This bibliography has first been compiled by Thomas Metzinger and David 
Chalmers to appear in print in two philosophical anthologies on conscious 
experience (Metzinger 1995a, b). From 1995 onwards it has been continuously 
updated by Thomas Metzinger, and now is freely available as a PDF-, RTF-, or 
HTML-file from his personal homepage at http://www.philosophie.uni-
mainz.de/metzinger/. Other formats are available upon request. This bibliography 
mainly attempts to cover the Anglo-Saxon and German debates, in a non-annotated, 
fully formatted way that makes it easy to “cut and paste” from the original file. To a 
certain degree this bibliography also contains items in other languages than English 
and German - all submissions in other languages are welcome. Please submit new 
entries, errata etc. to metzinger@uni-mainz.de. Last update of current version: July 
13th, 2001. 
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3.2 CONSCIOUSNESS, PHYSICALISM AND THE MIND-
BODY PROBLEM 
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3.5 DENNETT ON CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
An important reductive account of consciousness has been developed by Daniel Dennett 
over a period of many years, and has received wide attention from other researchers. Because 
these papers often do not fit naturally into the other subject-oriented sections, we have 
collected them into a single section here. 
 
 
- 29 - 
Akins, K. & Winger, S. (1996). Ships in the night: Churchland and Ramachandran on Dennett's 
theory of consciousness. In Akins 1996. 
Akins, K. (1996). Lost the plot? Reconstructing Dennett's multiple drafts theory of 
consciousness. Mind and Language, 11, 1-43. 
Arbib, M. (1972). Consciousness: The secondary role of language. Journal of Philosophy, 69, 579-
91. 
Baars, B.J. & McGovern, K. (1993). Does philosophy help or hinder scientific work on 
consciousness? Consciousness and Cognition, 2, 18-27. 
Baker, L.R. (1995). Content meets consciousness. Philosophical Topics, 22, 1-22. 
Block, N. (1995). What is Dennett’s theory a theory of? Philosophical Topics, 22, 23-40. 
Bricke, J. (1984). Dennett's eliminative arguments. Philosophical Studies, 45, 413-29. 
Bricke, J. (1985). Consciousness and Dennett’s intentionalist net. Philosophical Studies, 48, 249-
56. 
Cam, P. (1985). Phenomenology and speech dispositions. Philosophical Studies, 47, 357-68. 
Churchland, P.S. & Ramachandran, V.S. (1993). Filling in: Why Dennett is wrong. In Dahlbom 
1993. Also in Revonsuo & Kamppinen 1994. 
Clark, S.R.L. (1993). Minds, memes, and rhetoric. Inquiry, 36, 3-16. 
Dennett, D. (2001). Are we explaining consciousness yet? Cognition, 79, 221-37. 
Dennett, D.C. & Kinsbourne, M. (1991). Time and the observer: The where and when of 
consciousness in the brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 15, 183-247. Reprinted in 
Block et al. 1997. 
Dennett, D.C. (1976). Are dreams experiences? Philosophical Review, 73, 151-71. Reprinted in 
Dennett 1978. 
Dennett, D.C. (1978). Reply to Arbib and Gunderson. In Dennett 1978. 
Dennett, D.C. (1978). Toward a cognitive theory of consciousness. In Dennett 1978. 
Dennett, D.C. (1978). Why you can't make a computer that feels pain. Synthese, 38, 415-56. 
Reprinted in Dennett 1978. 
Dennett, D.C. (1979). On the absence of phenomenology. In D. Gustafson & B. Tapscott (eds), 
Body, mind and method: Essays in Honor of Virgil Aldrich. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. 
Dennett, D.C. (1979). The onus re experiences: A reply to Emmett. Philosophical Studies, 35, 
315-8. 
Dennett, D.C. (1981). Wondering where the yellow went. Monist, 64, 102-08. 
Dennett, D.C. (1982). How to study human consciousness empirically, or nothing comes to 
mind. Synthese, 59, 159-80. 
Dennett, D.C. (1986). Julian Jaynes' software archaeology. Canadian Psychology, 27, 149-54. 
Dennett, D.C. (1988). Quining qualia. In Marcel & Bisiach 1988. Reprinted in Block et al. 1997. 
German translation in Heckmann & Walter 2001. 
Dennett, D.C. (1988). The evolution of consciousness. In J. Brockman (ed), Speculations. The 
Reality Club. New York: Prentice Hall Press. 
Dennett, D.C. (1991). Lovely and suspect qualities. In Villanueva 1991. 
Dennett, D.C. (1993). Caveat emptor. Consciousness and Cognition, 2, 48-57. 
Dennett, D.C. (1993). Living on the edge. Inquiry, 36, 135-59. 
Dennett, D.C. (1993). Précis of Consciousness Explained. Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, 53, 889-92. 
- 30 - 
Dennett, D.C. (1993). The message is: There is no medium. Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, 53, 919-31. 
Dennett, D.C. (1995). Get real. Philosophical Topics, 22, 505-60. 
Dennett, D.C. (1996). Bewußtsein hat mehr mit Ruhm als mit Fernsehen zu tun. In Maar, C., 
Pöppel, E. & Christaller, T (Hrsg.), Die Technik auf dem Weg zur Seele: Forschungen an 
der Schnittstelle Gehirn / Computer. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt (rororo science 
60133). 
Dennett, D.C. (1996). Seeing is believing - or is it? In Akins 1996. 
Dretske, F. (1995). Differences that make no difference. Philosophical Topics, 22, 41-58. 
Emmett, K. (1978). Oneiric experiences. Philosophical Studies, 34, 445-50. 
Fellows, R. & O'Hear, A. (1993). Consciousness avoided. Inquiry, 36, 73-91. 
Foster, J. (1993). Dennett's rejection of dualism. Inquiry, 36, 17-31. 
Gunderson, K. (1972). Content and Consciousness and the mind-body problem. Journal of 
Philosophy, 69, 591-604. 
Jackson, F. (1993). Appendix A (for philosophers). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 
53, 899-903. 
Kirk, R. (1993). “The best set of tools?” Dennett's metaphors and the mind-body problem. 
Philosophical Quarterly, 43, 335-43. 
Leyens, S. (2000). The imagined consciousness - The eliminativism of Daniel Dennett. Revue 
philosophique de Louvain, 98, 761-82. 
Lockwood, M. (1993). Dennett's mind. Inquiry, 36, 59-72. 
Lormand, E. (1995). Qualia! (Now showing at a theater near you.) Philosophical Topics, 22, 127-
56. 
Mangan, B. (1993). Dennett, consciousness, and the sorrows of functionalism. Consciousness 
and Cognition, 2, 1-17. 
Marbach, E. (1988). How to study consciousness phenomenologically or quite a lot comes to 
mind. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 19, 252-68. 
Marbach, E. (1994). Troubles with heterophenomenology. In Casati, Smith & White 1994. 
McCauley, R.N. (1993). Why the blind can't lead the blind: Dennett on the blind spot, 
blindsight, and sensory qualia. Consciousness and Cognition, 2, 155-64. 
McGinn, C. (1995). Consciousness evaded: Comments on Dennett. Philosophical Perspectives, 9, 
241-49. 
Nikolinakos, D.D. (2000). Dennett on qualia: the case of pain, smell and taste. Philosophical 
Psychology, 13, 505-22. 
Radner, D. (1994). Heterophenomenology: Learning about the birds and the bees. Journal of 
Philosophy, 91, 389-403. 
Raffman, D. (1993). Qualms about Quining qualia. In D. Raffman, Language, Music, and Mind. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Ramachandran, V.S. (1993). Filling in gaps in logic: Some comments on Dennett. Consciousness 
and Cognition, 2, 165-8. 
Rey, G. (1995). Dennett’s unrealistic psychology. Philosophical Topics, 22, 259-90. 
Robinson, W.S. (1972). Dennett's analysis of awareness. Philosophical Studies, 23, 147-52. 
Robinson, W.S. (1994). Orwell, Stalin, and determinate qualia. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 
75, 151-xxx. 
- 31 - 
Rorty, R. (1972). Dennett on awareness. Philosophical Studies, 23, 153-62. 
Rorty, R. (1993). Holism, intrinsicality, and the ambition of transcendence. In Dahlbom 1993.  
Rosenthal, D.M. (1993). Multiple drafts and higher-order thoughts. Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, 53, 911-18. 
Rosenthal, D.M. (1995). First-person operationalism and mental taxonomy. Philosophical Topics, 
22, 319-50. Expanded version in Rosenthal 1999. 
Rosenthal, D.M. (1995). Multiple drafts and facts of the matter. In Metzinger 1995b. German 
translation in Metzinger 1995a. 
Ross, D. (1993). Quining qualia Quine’s way. Dialogue, 32, 439-59. 
Ross, D. (1994). Dennett’s conceptual reform. Behavior and Philosophy, 22, 41-52. 
Seager, W. (1993). The elimination of experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 53, 
345-65. 
Seager, W. (1993). Verification, skepticism, and consciousness. Inquiry, 36, 113-36. 
Shoemaker, S. (1993). Lovely and suspect ideas. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 53, 
903-8. 
Siewert, C. (1993). What Dennett can't imagine and why. Inquiry, 36, 93-112. 
Sprigge, T.L.S. (1993). Is Dennett a disillusioned zimbo? Inquiry, 36, 33-57. 
Toribio, J. (1993). Why there still has to be a theory of consciousness. Consciousness and 
Cognition, 2, 28-47. 
Tye, M. (1993). Reflections on Dennett and consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, 53, 891-6. 
Van Gulick, R. (1995). Dennett, drafts, and phenomenal realism. Philosophical Topics, 22, 443-
56.  
 
3.6 CONSCIOUSNESS: MISCELLANEOUS 
 
This section contains miscellaneous philosophical articles on consciousness. These include 
very broad articles on the subject, as well as articles on smaller specific topics that do not have 
sections of their own. 
 
 
Antony, M.V. (1994). Against functionalist theories of consciousness. Mind & Language, 9, 105-
23. 
Antony, M.V. (2001). Is 'consciousness' ambiguous? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8, 19-44. 
Baars, B.J. (1995). Understanding subjectivity: Global workspace theory and the resurrection of 
the observing self. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 3, 211-16. 
Baas, N. (1996). A framework for higher-order cognition and consciousness. In Hameroff et al. 
1996. 
Bayne, T. (2000) The unity of consciousness: Clarification and defence. Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy, 78, 248-54. 
Beckermann, A. (1994). Metarepräsentationen und phänomenale Zustände. In Lenk & Poser 
1994. 
- 32 - 
Beckermann, A. (1995). Visual information-processing and phenomenal consciousness. In 
Metzinger 1995b. German translation in Metzinger 1995a. 
Bickerton, D. (2000). Resolving discontinuity: A minimalist distinction between human and 
non-human minds. American Zoologist, 40, 862-73. 
Bieri, P. (1982). Nominalism and inner experience. The Monist, 65, 68-87. German translation: 
Nominalismus und innere Erfahrung. Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 36, 3-24. 
Bieri, P. (1986). Zeiterfahrung und Personalität. In H. Burger (Hrsg.), Natur, Mensch und Zeit. 
Berlin: Arno Spitz. 
Birnbacher, D. (1994). Einige Gründe, das Hirntodkriterium zu akzeptieren. In J. Hoff & J. in 
der Schmitten (Hrsg.), Wann ist der Mensch tot? Organverpflanzung und “Hirntod”-
Kriterium. Reinbek: Rowohlt. 
Block, N. (2001). Paradox and cross purposes in recent work on consciousness. Cognition, 79, 
197-219. 
Brown, S.R. (2000). Tip-of-the-tongue phenomena: An introductory phenomenological analysis. 
Consciousness and Cognition, 9, 516-37. 
Burns, J. (1996). The possibility of empirical test of hypotheses about consciousness. In 
Hameroff et al. 1996. 
Cam, P. (1989). Notes toward a faculty theory of cognitive consciousness. In Slezak 1989. 
Cartmill, M. (2000). Animal consciousness: Some philosophical, methodological, and 
evolutionary problems. American Zoologist, 40, 835-46. 
Cassam, Q. (1995). Introspection and bodily self-ascription. In Bermúdez et al. 1995. 
Chalmers, D.J. (1995). Facing up to the problem of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness 
Studies, 2, 200-19. Also in Hameroff et al. 1996. German translation in Esken & 
Heckmann 1998. 
Chapman, C.R. & Nakamura, Y. (1999). A passion of the soul: An introduction to pain for 
consciousness researchers. Consciousness and Cognition, 8, 391-422. 
Chapman, C.R., Nakamura, Y. & Chapman C.N. (2000). Pain and folk theory. Brain and Mind, 
1, 209-22. 
Chisholm, R.M. (1990). Questions about the unity of consciousness. In Cramer et al. 1990. 
Church, J. (1998). Two sorts of consciousness? Communication and Cognition, 31, 57-72. 
Cicogna, P. & Bosinelli, M. (2001). Consciousness during dreams. Consciousness and Cognition, 
10, 26-41. 
Clark, T.W. (1995). Function and phenomenology: Closing the explanatory gap. Journal of 
Consciousness Studies, 2, 241-54. 
Cotterill, R.M.J. (2000). Did consciousness evolve from self-paced probing of the environment, 
and not from reflexes? Brain and Mind, 1, 283-98. 
Cotterill, R.M.J. (2001). Evolution, cognition and consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 
8, 3-17. 
Dalla Barba, G. (2001). Beyond the memory-trace paradox and the fallacy of the homunculus - 
A hypothesis concerning the relationship between memory, consciousness and 
temporality. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8, 51-78. 
Dawkins, M.S. (2001). Who needs consciousness? Animal Welfare Suppl., 10, 19-29. See also 
Anonymus 2000 (section 2.2). 
- 33 - 
Dedeurwaerdere, T. (2000). Cognitivist reversal and theories of consciousness. Revue 
philosophique de Louvain, 98, 732-60. 
Dennett, D.C. (1995). Facing backwards on the problem of consciousness. Journal of 
Consciousness Studies, 3, 4-6. 
Dewan, E.M. (1976). Consciousness as an emergent causal agent in the context of control 
system theory. In Globus, Maxwell & Savodnik 1976. 
Dietrich, E. & Gillies, A. (2001). Consciousness and the limits of our imaginations. Synthese, 126, 
361-81. 
Dretske, D. (1998). Selbst-Bewußtsein. In Esken & Heckmann 1998. 
Dupuis, M. (2000). Consciousness and the imagination of the other. Revue philosophique de 
Louvain, 98, 783-99. 
Ebeling, H. (1990). Das Subjekt im Dasein. Versuch über das bewußte Sein. In Cramer et al. 
1990. 
Eilan, N. (1995). Consciousness and the self. In Bermúdez et al. 1995. 
Eilan, N. (2000). Primitive consciousness and the 'hard problem'. Journal of Consciousness 
Studies, 7, 28-39. 
Fellmann, F. (1996). Intentionalität und zuständliches Bewußtsein. In Krämer 1996. 
Field, A.P. (2000). I like it, but I'm not sure why: Can evaluative conditioning occur without 
conscious awareness? Consciousness and Cognition, 9, 13-36 
Flanagan, O. (1997). Prospects for a unified theory of consciousness or, What dreams are made 
of. In Cohen & Schooler 1997. Reprinted in Block et al. 1997. 
Flohr, H.  (2000). Subjektivität. In H. J. Sandkühler (ed), Selbstrepräsentation in Natur und Kultur. 
Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang. 
Flohr, H. (1989). Schwierigkeiten der Autocerebroskopie. In Pöppel 1989. 
Flohr, H. (1994). Denken und Bewußtsein. In J. Fedrowitz, D. Matejovski & G. Kaiser (Hrsg.), 
Neuroworlds. Geist - Gehirn - Kultur. Frankfurt/New York: Campus Verlag. 
Forman, R.K. (1998). What does mysticism have to teach us about consciousness? Journal of 
Consciousness Studies, 5, 185-201. 
Fox, I. (1985). The individualization of consciousness. Philosophical Topics, 13, 119-43. 
Gadenne, V. (1993). Bewußtsein, Selbstbewußtsein und Reflexion. Logos, 1, 82-103. 
Gennaro, R.J. (1992). Consciousness, self-consciousness, and episodic memory. Philosophical 
Psychology, 5, 333-47. 
Glicksohn, J. (2001). Temporal cognition and the phenomenology of time: A multiplicative 
function for apparent duration. Consciousness and Cognition, 10, 1-25. 
Goldman, A.I. (2000). Can science know when you 're conscious? Epistemological foundations 
of consciousness research. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 7, 3-22. 
Griffin, D.R. (1998). From cognition to consciousness. Animal Cognition, 1, 3-16. 
Grush, R. & Churchland, P.S. (1995). Gaps in Penrose's toiling. In Metzinger 1995b. German 
translation in Metzinger 1995a. 
Gustafson, D. (2000). On the supposed utility of a folk theory of pain. Brain and Mind, 1, 223-8. 
Güzeldere, G. (1995a). Consciousness: What it is, how to study it, what to learn from ist history. 
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2, 30-52. 
Güzeldere, G. (1995b). Problems of consciousness: Contemporary issues, current debates. 
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2, 112-43. 
- 34 - 
Güzeldere, G. (1997). Introduction: The many faces of consciousness: A field guide. In Block et 
al. 1997. 
Hannay, A. (1987). The claims of consciousness: A critical survey. Inquiry, 30, 395-434. 
Hardcastle, V.G. (1993). The naturalists versus the skeptics: The debate over a scientific 
understanding of consciousness. Journal of Mind & Behavior, 14, 27-50. 
Hardcastle, V.G. (1995). The why of consciousness: A non-issue for materialists. Journal of 
Consciousness Studies, 3, 7-13. 
Hardcastle, V.G. (2000). How to understand the N in NCC. In Metzinger 2000. 
Harman, W. (1996). Toward a science of consciousness: Addressing two central questions. In 
Hameroff et al. 1996. 
Harnad, S. (1982). Consciousness: An afterthought. Cognition and Brain Theory, 5, 29-47. 
Helekar, S.A. (1999). On the possibility of universal neural coding of subjective experience. 
Consciousness and Cognition, 8, 423-46. 
Hershfield, J. (1998). Lycan on the subjectivity of the mental. Philosophical Psychology, 11, 229-
38. 
Hodgson, D. (1995). The easy problems ain’t so easy.Journal of Consciousness Studies, 3, 69-75. 
Holenstein, E. (1996). Die kausale Rolle von Bewußtsein und Vernunft. In Krämer 1996. 
Humphrey, N. (2000). How to solve the mind-body problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 7, 
5-20. 
Humphrey, N.K. (1988). The uses of consciousness. In J. Brockman (ed), Speculations. The 
Reality Club. New York: Prentice Hall Press. 
Kemmerling, A. (1996). Bewußtsein. In A. Kemmerling, Ideen des Ichs. Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp. 
Kern, I. (2000). Zwei Prinzipien der Bewusstseinseinheit: Erlebtsein und Zusammenhang der 
Erlebnisse. Facta Philosophica, 2, 51-74. 
Kirk, R. (1992). Consciousness and concepts. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 
Supplementary Volume 66, 23-40. 
Kirk, R. (1995). How is consciousness possible? In Metzinger 1995b. German translation in 
Metzinger 1995a. 
Kirkwood, J.K. & Hubrecht, R. (2001). Animal consciousness, cognition and welfare. Animal 
Welfare Suppl., 10, 5-17. See also Anonymus 2000 (section 2.2). 
Kraemer, E.R. (1984). Consciousness and the exclusivity of function. Mind, 93, 271-5. 
Kuczaj, S., Tranel, K., Trone, M. et al. (2001). Are animals capable of deception or empathy? 
Implications for animal consciousness and animal welfare. Animal Welfare Suppl., 10, 
161-173. See also Anonymus 2000 (section 32.2). 
Kurthen, M. (1993). Zur Sprachlichkeit des Unbewußten angesichts der orthodoxen 
Kognitionswissenschaft. In Tress & Nagel 1993. 
Kurthen, M. (1995). On the prospects of a naturalistic theory of phenomenal consciousness. In 
Metzinger 1995b. German translation in Metzinger 1995a. 
Kurthen, M., Linke, D.B., Reuter, B.M. & Moskopp, D. (1991). Das Subjekt des Todes. Zur 
aktuellen Kontroverse um hirnorientierte Todesbestimmungen. Wiener Medizinische 
Wochenschrift, 141, 31-2. 
LaBerge, D., Auclair, L. & Sieroff, E. (2000). Preparatory attention: Experiment and theory. 
Consciousness and Cognition, 9, 396-434. 
- 35 - 
Langsam, H. (2000). Experiences, thoughts, and qualia. Philosophical Studies, 99, 269-95. 
Lenzen, W. (1998). Zombies, Zimbos und das “schwierige Problem” des Bewußtseins. In Esken 
& Heckmann 1998. 
Levin, J. (1997) Consciousness disputed. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 48, 91-
///. 
Levine, J. (1997). Recent work on consciousness. American Philosophical Quarterly, 34, 379-404. 
Libet, B. (1995). Solutions to the hard problem of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness 
Studies, 3, 33-5. 
Lloyd, D. (1996). Consciousness, connectionism, and cognitive neuroscience: A meeting of 
minds. Philosophical Psychology, 9, 61-79. 
Lormand, E. (1996). Nonphenomenal consciousness. Noûs, 30, 242-61. 
Lowe, E.J. (1995). There are no easy problems of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 
2, 266-71. 
Lurz, Robert W. (1999). Animal Consciousness. Journal of Philosophical Research, 24, 149-///. 
Lycan, W.G. (1998). Phenomenal information again: It is both real and intrinsically perspectival. 
Philosophical Psychology, 11, 239-42. 
Marbach, E. (1984). On using intentionality in empirical phenomenology: The problem of 
‘mental images’. Dialectica, 38, 209-29. 
Marcel, A. (1988). Phenomenal experience and functionalism. In Marcel & Bisiach 1988. 
Maund, J.B. (1986). The phenomenal and other uses of ‘looks’. Australasian Philosophical 
Quarterly, 64, 170-80. 
Metzinger, T. (1994). Zeitfenster im Gehirn und die Einheit des Bewußtseins. In Lenk & Poser 
1993. 
Metzinger, T. (1995). Perspektivische Fakten? Die Naturalisierung des View from Nowhere. In G. 
Meggle & U. Wessels (eds), Analyomen 2. Proceedings of the 2nd Conference “Perspectives 
in Analytical Philosophy”. Berlin/New York: de Gruyter. 
Metzinger, T. (1996c). Von der Bewußtseinsethik zur Bewußtseinskultur. Wechselwirkung, 12, 2-
8. 
Metzinger, T. (2000). Auf der Suche nach einem neuen Bild des Menschen. Spiegel der 
Forschung, 1, 58-67.  
Metzinger, T. (2000). General introduction: consciousness research at the end of the twentieth 
century. In Metzinger 2000. 
Metzinger. (1996). Niemand sein. Kann man eine naturalistische Perspektive auf die 
Subjektivität des Mentalen einnehmen? In Krämer 1996. 
Mills, E. (1995). Giving up on the hard problem of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness 
Studies, 3, 26-32. 
Moody, T. (1994). Conversations with zombies. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 1, 196-200. See 
also ZOMBIE EARTH: A Symposium on Todd Moody’s Conversations with Zombies. 
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2, 312-72. 
Murata, J. (1997). Consciousness and the mind-body problem. In Ito et al. 1997. 
Myin, E. (1994). Over visueel bewustzijn. In J.P. Van Bendegem & G. Cornelis (eds), Wie mij 
liefheeft, volge mij niet. Brussels: VUB Press. 
Myin, E. (1995). Visuele waarneming, kleuren en bewustzijn. In M. De Mey & E. De Nil (eds), 
Perspectiva tussen Aristoteles en Zeki Gent: Communicatie en Cognitie. 
- 36 - 
Natika, N. (1991). Consciousness, qualia, and reentrant signalling. Behavior and Philosophy, 19, 
21-41. 
Newton, N. (1982). Experience and imagery. Southern Journal of Philosophy, 21, 475-87. 
Nida-Rümelin, M. (1997). Subjekte von Erfahrung und die Zuschreibung mentaler 
Eigenschaften. Logos, N.F. 4, 59-81. 
Oatley, K. (1988). On changing one's mind: A possible function of consciousness. In Marcel & 
Bisiach 1988. 
O'Brien, G. & Opie, J. (2000). Disunity defended: A reply to Bayne. Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy, 78, 255-63. 
O'Brien, G. & Opie, J. (2002) The multiplicity of consciousness and the emergence of the self. In 
A.S.David & T.Kircher (eds.), The Self and Schizophrenia: A Neuropsychological 
Perspective, Cambridge University Press. 
O'Brien, G.O. & Opie, J. (1998). The disunity of consciousness. Australian Journal of Philosophy,  
76, 378-95. 
Pauen, M. (1996). Die Logik der Wahrnehmung und das “Rätsel des Bewußtseins”. In Hubig & 
Poser 1996. 
Pauen, M. (1996). Wahrnehmung und mentale Repräsentation. Philosophische Rundschau, 63, 
243-64. 
Penrose, R. & Hameroff, S. (1995).What ‘Gaps’? - Reply to Grush and Churchland. Journal of 
Consciousness Studies, 2, 98-111. 
Pohlenz, G. (1990). Phänomenale Qualitäten, Erkenntnis und das philosophische Problem der 
Leib-Seele-Beziehung. Philosophisches Jahrbuch, 97, 69-104. 
Pohlenz, G. (1990). Phänomenale Realität und naturalistische Philosophie. Eine systematische 
Widerlegung der Feigl’schen und Sellars’schen Theorien phänomenaler Qualitäten und 
Skizze einer alternativen Theorie. Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 44, 106-42. 
Pohlenz, G. (1992). Kein Platz für phänomenale Qualitäten und Leib-Umwelt-Interaktion? Eine 
Kritik transzendentalistischer Tendenzen in der modernen Theorie empirischer 
Wissenschaft. Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 46, 363-80. 
Pothast, U. (1990). Etwas über “Bewußtsein”. In Cramer et al. 1990. 
Proust, J. (2000). Awareness of being the actor of one's actions: three levels of analysis. In 
Metzinger 2000. 
Quante, M. (1998). Die Enträtselung des Bewußtseins? Neuere Beiträge zu Philosophie des 
Geistes (Teil II). Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 52, 610-33. 
Resnik, D.B. (2000). Pain as a folk psychological concept: a clinical perspective. Brain and Mind, 
1, 193-207. 
Revonsuo, A. (1993). Is there a ghost in the cognitive machinery? Philosophical Psychology, 6, 
387-405. 
Revonsuo, A. (1994). In search of the science of consciousness. In Revonsuo & Kamppinen 
1994. 
Rey, G. (1995). Towards a projectivist account of conscious experience. In Metzinger 1995b. 
German translation in Metzinger 1995a. 
Richards, W. (1984). Self-consciousness and agency. Synthese, 61, 149-71. 
Ritvo, H. (2000). Animal consciousness: Some historical perspective. American Zoologist, 40, 
847-52. 
- 37 - 
Robinson, W.S. (1995). The hardness of the hard problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 3, 
14-25. 
Rosenberg, G.H. (1995). Rethinking nature: A hard problem within the hard problem. Journal of 
Consciousness Studies, 3, 76-88. 
Rosenthal, D.M. (1999). Consciousness and its expression. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XII, 
///. Reprinted in Rosenthal 1999. 
Savage-Rumbaugh, S., Fields, W.M. & Taglialatela, J. (2000): Ape consciousness-human 
consciousness: A perspective informed by language and culture. American Zoologist, 40, 
910-21. 
Schleichert, H. (1989). The relationship between consciousness and language. In J.R. Brown & J. 
Mittelstrass (eds), An intimate relation. Studies in the history and philosophy of science, 
presented to Robert E. Butts on his 60th birthday. Dordrecht: Academic Publishers . 
Schmitz, H. (1996). Bewußtsein als instabiles Mannigfaltiges. In Krämer 1996. 
Seager, W. (1995). Consciousness, information and panpsychism. Journal of Consciousness 
Studies, 2, 272-88. 
Seager, W. (1995). Consciousness, information, and panpsychism. Journal of Consciousness 
Studies, 2, 272-88. 
Searle, J.R. (1998). How to study consciousness scientifically. Philosophical Transactions of the 
Royal Society of London B, 353, 1935-42. 
Searle, J.R. (2000). Consciousness, free action and the brain. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 7, 
3-22. 
Shanon, B. (1998). What is the function of consciousness? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 5, 
295-308. 
Shear, J. (1995). The hard problem: Closing the empirical gap. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 3, 
54-68. 
Sheets-Johnstone, M. (1998). Consciousness: A natural history. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 
5, 260-94. 
Shoemaker, S. (1990). First-person access. Philosophical Perspectives, 4, 187-214. Reprinted in 
Shoemaker 1996. 
Shoemaker, S. (1996). Unity of consciousness and consciousness of unity. In Shoemaker 1996. 
Sleutels, J. (1998). Phenomenal consciousness – Epiphenomenalism, naturalism and perceptual 
plasticity. Communication and Cognition, 31, 21-56. 
Sloman, A. (1994). The mind as a control system. In Hookway & Peterson 1994. 
Smith, D.W. (1986). The structure of (self-) consciousness. Topoi, 5, 149-56. 
Sokolowski, R. (1992). Parallelism in conscious experience. Daedalus, issued as: Proceedings of 
the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 120, 87-103. 
Staddon, J.E.R. (2000). Consciousness and theoretical behaviorism. American Zoologist, 40, 874-
82. 
Stadler, M. & Kruse, P. (1992). Zur Emergenz psychischer Qualitäten. Das psychophysische 
Problem im Lichte der Selbstorganisationstheorie. In W. Krohn & G. Küppers, 
Emergenz: Die Entstehung von Ordnung, Organisation und Bedeutung. Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp. 
Stevenson, L. (2000). Synthetic unities of experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 
60, 281-305. 
- 38 - 
Sufka, K.J. (2000). Chronic pain explained. Brain and Mind, 1, 155-79. 
Taylor, K. (2001). Applying continuous modelling to consciousness. Journal of Consciousness 
Studies, 8, 45-60. 
Tetens, H. (1996). Die Rettung der mentalen Phänomene? Eine kurze Regieanweisung für 
einen nicht-reduktiven Materialismus. In Krämer 1996. 
Tienson, J.L. (1987). Brains are not conscious. Philosophical Papers, 16, 187-93. 
Tye, M. (1997). The problem of simple minds: Is there anything it is like to be a honey bee? 
Philosophical Topics, ///, ///. German translation in Esken & Heckmann 1998. 
Valentine, E. (1999). Popper’s three worlds and attitudes to the explanatory gap. New Ideas in 
Psychology, 17, 31-9. 
Valentine, J.D. (1982). Towards a physics for consciousness. Psychoenergetics, 4, 257-74. 
Van Gulick, R. (1989). What difference does consciousness make? Philosophical Topics, 17, 211-
30. 
Van Gulick, R. (1994). Deficit studies and the function of phenomenal consciousness. In G. 
Graham & G.L. Stephens (eds), Philosophical Psychopathology. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press. 
Warner, R. (1995). Facing ourselves: Incorrigibility and the mind-body problem. Journal of 
Consciousness Studies, 3, 217-30. 
Wemelsfelder, F. (2001). The inside and outside aspects of consciousness: Complementary 
approaches to the study of animal emotion. Animal Welfare Suppl., 10, 129-39. See also 
Anonymus 2000 (section 2.2). 
Wiehl, R. (1990). Die Komplementrität von Selbstsein und Bewußtsein. In Cramer et al. 1990. 
Zemach, E. (1986). Unconscious mind or conscious minds. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 10. 
Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press. In French, P.A., Uehling, T.E. & Wettstein, 
H.K. [Eds] Studies in Philosophy of Mind. 
Zeman, A. (2001). Invited Review: Consciousness. Brain, 124, 1263-89. 
Ziemke, A. (1996). Kognitive Neurobiologie als Reflexionsproblem. Auf der Suche nach neuen 
Denkformen neurowissenschaftlicher Forschung. In Ziemke, A. & Kaehr, R (Hrsg.), 
Selbstorganisation. Jahrbuch für Komplexität in den Natur-, Sozial- und 









An important thread in the philosophical literature on consciousness concerns the 
relationship between our knowledge of our consciousness and our knowledge of the objective 
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3.9 QUALIA: MISCELLANEOUS 
 
 
This section includes miscellaneous articles on qualia, or experiential properties, or 
phenomenal properties, as well as on specific sorts of experiences, such as color and pain 
experiences. Note that the division between many of these articles and those on 
“consciousness” is often only of a superficial nature. 
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cognitive psychology and in cognitive science in general. This small selection is very far 
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